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Several studies have been conducted to analyze whether a regulation of the
postal sector as a monopoly is actually ecient by examining its cost struc-
ture. The authors detected signicant scale economies only in the delivery
function and hence demonstrated a necessity for competition in the upstream
operations. The primary purpose of this paper is to summarize the basic con-
ditions of natural monopoly theory and to review the approaches and results
of the studies dealing with this topic. Despite the importance of contestabil-
ity in this context, previous literature concentrates only on the subadditivity
aspect. The existence of economies of scale does not inevitably justify a gov-
ernmental maintenance of the monopoly if the market is contestable. In this
respect, further research is needed in order to account for contestability.
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11 Introduction
Previous studies concerning the postal sector analyze whether the postal sector exhibits
characteristics of natural monopoly. The aim is to test the existence of subadditivity in
order to determine whether and how postal networks should be regulated. The existence
of such characteristics in a postal network would have important policy implications. If
the conditions of the natural monopoly are satised, it is preferable that only one supplier
oers the postal services, because competition would lead to eciency losses. In addition,
there is a strong need for governmental regulation if only one supplier provides the postal
services due to the risk that the monopolist charges excessive prices. However, it has been
shown that there are postal operations where a competitive structure would be benecial,
because they do not exhibit characteristics of natural monopoly. The existence of a
natural monopoly can be tested by analyzing the presence of scale and scope economies
or subadditivity respectively. The question of the existence of a natural monopoly is
relevant to decide whether market-entry is - due to eciency reasons - desirable or not.
However, Harold Demsetz has already in the sixties noted the importance of sunk costs
- a major barrier to entry - for such issues (Demsetz 1969). Despite this importance,
this aspect is not considered suciently in previous empirical investigations.
This paper focuses on the theory of natural monopoly applied to the postal sector
and the econometric studies which have been conducted to examine this for the postal
sector. The aim of this paper is to depict the principle ideas of the most relevant studies
and to show the dierences between the approaches of the dierent authors.
The paper is divided into two main parts. To understand the approaches, it is nec-
essary to have a closer look on the theoretical background of this theme. A central
question is what set of conditions are sucient for cost subadditivity, and thus, for nat-
ural monopoly and how this can be applied to the postal industry sector. This issue
will be discussed in the rst part of this paper. The second and main part deals with
the econometric studies which have been conducted to analyze the cost structure of
postal service providers in dierent countries. In this part the approaches, the underly-
ing datasets and the results of the studies will be reviewed and compared. Finally, the
2results will be summarized and it will be shown that contestability - a central aspect in
this context - is not considered in the previous research studies.
2 Theoretical Foundations of Subadditivity
The subadditivity concept is used to determine whether an industry exhibits monopolis-
tic features. For an industry to be characterized as a natural monopoly, its cost function
must be strictly subadditive over the entire relevant range of output (Baumol et al. 1988,
p. 17). A natural monopoly is a market structure where it is ecient that a specic
output vector is being produced by a single rm. Economies of scale and Economies of
scope are the two major conditions associated with this issue. They help to determine
whether competition should for eciency reasons be introduced in a specic market and
in which certain operational area this must be done. If, for example, an industry does
not exhibit features of natural monopoly, it may be benecial to encourage competition
in this area. This section includes a theoretical discussion of the sucient conditions
for natural monopoly in the single- and multi-product case as the subadditivity concept
can be applied to both cases.
In the single-product case global economies of scale are sucient for subadditivity
and thus for the existence of natural monopoly (Baumol et al. 1988, p. 22). Economies
of scale denote the benets from producing a higher amount of output. The existence of
economies of scale therefore implicates that a rm could save costs when operating on a
higher output-level. In other words, in terms of market structure scale economies imply
that it is cheaper for one rm to produce a certain amount of a product than for two or
more rms at a given output-level. Thus, the average costs of production diminish at
higher output-levels, which is illustrated in gure 1 (Fritsch et al. 2007, pp. 184).
The intersection of the demand function D with the average cost function AC deter-
mines in this case the relevant market demand. It results from the declining average
cost function that it is benecial that the demanded amount X2 is supplied by only
one rm at the price of P2. Each output quantity lower than X2 can only be supplied
at signicantly higher average costs. If, for example, two rms supply the output X2
3Figure 1: Average Costs in Natural Monopolies (Fritsch et al. 2007, p. 185)
together, each of them supplying the lower output X1 at the price P1, then the costs of
producing one unit would be higher.
There are various reasons which can induce the existence of scale economies. A few
examples of the most common reasons are a minimum amount of the input factors,
economies of density, stochastic savings or learning curve eects.1 The existence of one
or more of these causes can lead to the existence of global scale economies and thus
to a subadditive cost structure. With regard to industry structure, a subadditive cost
structure would imply that it is cheaper for one rm to produce the whole output than
for multiple autonomous rms to do so, whereas each produces a subset of the total









Following this construction, the cost function C(X) is subadditive, when for all output-
subsets Xi (with i = 1;:::;n) less production costs arise, if only one supplier produces
1See Fritsch et al. 2007 for a closer discussion of the reasons for scale economies.
4the whole amount. Thereby at least two subsets Xi must be greater than zero in order
to satisfy this condition. The left side of this inequation represents the case that only
one rm produces the whole output and the right side the case of a separated production
by dierent companies (Fritsch et al. 2007, p. 188).
The extent of the economies of scale is usually measured by the elasticity of total costs
















The elasticity C indicates the change of the costs C, if the output q rises by one
percent. If the value of this elasticity is less than one, it can be concluded that the
industry exhibits substantial returns to scale. Thus it appears that - based on the
duality between production and cost functions - the inverse term of this elasticity can







The optimal size of an enterprise measured in terms of the output is following this
denition at the scale economies value S = 1 where the average costs (AC) equal the
marginal costs (MC) (Pindyck et al. 2009, pp. 329 and Baumol et al. 1988, p. 21).
The issue of subadditivity in the multi-product case was discussed in detail rst by
Baumol et al. in the eighties (Baumol et al. 1982 and 1988). Unlike the single-product
case, scope economies play an important role in the multi-product case, because of
the production of multiple heterogeneous commodities. In this context, declining ray
average costs, which is the equivalent to declining average costs in the single-product
case, is neither necessary nor sucient for subadditivity of the cost function. Conse-
quently, the sole consideration of scale economies will not help to determine whether
5a natural monopoly is present in the multi-product case. Instead, it is important to
analyze whether economies of scope are additionally present in the considered industry.
Economies of scope denote the cost savings which result from the production of several
dierent outputs jointly rather than separately. Thus, a combined production provides
a signicant cost reduction potential. However, the analysis in the multi-product case is
more complex which is primarily founded in the dierent cost-functions of the products.
Moreover, dierent amounts of the relevant market demand for the commodities compli-
cate the analysis additionally. Similar to the single-product case, in the multi-product
case several dierent reasons for the existence of economies of scope can arise. The
most common reason is that the same input-factors can be used for the production of
the dierent outputs. Using the example of a two-product industry, subadditivity can
formally be dened as follows:
C(X;Y ) < C(X;0) + C(0;Y ):
The left side of this inequation represents the costs in case of joint production of two
heterogeneous products by a single rm. Contrary, the right side represents the case
that these two products are supplied separately by two dierent rms whereas C(X;0)
represents the costs of the sole production of the commodity X and C(0;Y ) the costs
of the production of the commodity Y , respectively. If this inequation is satised, the
two commodities X and Y should for reasons of eciency be produced only by one rm,
because the costs of producing them in combination are less than the costs of producing
them separately (Fritsch et al. 2007, p. 192). To analyze whether subadditivity in a
multi-product sector is fullled, it is necessary to examine whether the cost-function in
the multi-product case exhibits mainly two particular features. Declining ray average
costs and trans-ray convexity must be present in order that the cost-function in the
multi-product sector exhibits subadditivity (Baumol et al. 1988, pp. 47). The combined
presence of declining ray average costs and trans-ray convexity indicates the existence
6of a natural monopoly, because it is technically ecient for only one rm to produce
a particular mix of products. Declining ray average costs denote the cost savings of
producing a higher amount of the product mix, whereas trans-ray convexity represents
the scope economies in a multi-product case. Figure 2 illustrates an idealized average
cost surface in which both subadditivity conditions, declining ray average costs and
trans-ray convexity in a two-product case, are satised.
Figure 2: Declining Ray Average Costs and Trans-Ray Convexity (Modelled after Bau-
mol 1982, p. 7)
The existence of declining ray average costs is the rst characteristic of this cost
surface. Since average costs cannot be dened in the multi-product case, the analysis of
the average cost function curvature does not refer to the single products, but to whole
output bundles whereas the proportions among the commodity quantities remain xed.
Thus, an arbitrary output vector or ray is chosen as a co-product in order to explore
the eect of an equivalent elevation or decline of both products on the costs (Baumol
71982, p. 6). In gure 2 the dashed line between the two points 0 and X represents this
ray and AC(X) represents the associated average cost function of this product bundle.
The essential features of the function AC(X) in gure 2 are identical to those shown in
gure 1.
The trans-ray convexity of the cost function illustrates the existence of economies
of scope, which result from the combined production of both products X1 and X2.
Trans-ray convexity can be applied to a multi-product rm and implies that it is less
expensive for a single rm to produce a particular combination of dierent products
than for dierent rms to produce them in isolation. This eect can be seen in gure
2 by considering the cross-section of the cost function. The sole production of either
X1 (point a) or X2 (point c) causes higher costs than a combined production of both
products (point b)(Baumol et al. 1988, pp. 48). The convexity of the cost function along
all rays through the origin indicates trans-ray convexity and thus the existence of scope
economies. However, if the eect of product-specic scale economies outweighs the eect
of the scope economies, it is better for rms to specialize in the separate production of
single goods. The joint presence of economies of scale and trans-ray convexity is sucient
for the presence of subadditivity in a multi-product industry and hence constitutes a
natural monopoly.
As for scale economies the magnitude of scope economies can be calculated using an
analogical measure. This measure quanties the additional costs that occur, if two or
more heterogeneous goods are not produced in common but separately. Formally, the
degree of scope economies can be dened as follows:
SCT(Y ) 
[C(YT) + C(YN T)]   C(Y )
C(Y )
:
The variable SCT(Y ) can be interpreted as the percental change of the costs, if the
whole product set N is not produced by only one rm. Thus, this measure quanties
the relative increase in cost which occurs, if the production of the two subsets T and
8N  T is separated. Such a separation of the production can lead either to an increase or
a decrease of the total costs. Of course, there is the possibility that the separation does
not have any eect on the total costs. These three cases are indicated by the measure
SCT(Y ), if it takes a value which is greater than, less than, or equal to zero respectively
(Baumol et al. 1988, pp. 73). A combined production of all goods or services is thus
less expensive, if the industry exhibits scope economies .
3 Characteristics of the Postal Sector
For a long time, usually only one mail service provider was in the postal sector, which
operated under the constraint of governmental regulation. This regulated monopoly,
however, has been already changed in several countries and many others will follow. To
answer the question whether this change is truly ecient, it is necessary to have a closer
look on the features of this industry, which is the focus of this section. In this context, the
network character, the value creation chain and the production processes of this industry
will be analyzed, which is necessary in order to test for the existence of subadditivity in
this industry. After reviewing the features of the industry, the theoretical discussion of
natural monopoly will be related to this specic setting.
Suppliers of mail delivery services represent a typical example for multi-product and
multi-input enterprises. The rms operating in the postal sector serve a complex network
of a large number of customers with dierent postal services using mail boxes, post
oces etc. The main service consists of the carriage of mail although most rms provide
further services e.g. the carriage and delivery of parcels and newspaper magazines. The
network feature of this industry plays an exposed role because it is indispensable in
order to provide an area-wide delivery of postal items. This is why the postal sector is
counted among the network industries. However, compared to other network-industries
the single elements of postal networks are not obvious by implication due to the fact that
it is a transport network with common means of transportation used for the distances
between the dierent locations of sender and addressee. In order to serve an area, a
certain infrastructure for the collection, transport, and delivery of postal items need to
9be developed in this area. The basic network elements are the mail boxes positioned
in the area, the oces and counters, processing facilities, means of transportation, like
road vehicles or airplanes, and most notably the employees in this branch especially
those working in the delivery section. Figure 3 illustrates a basic model of a stylized
postal network with its major elements.
Figure 3: Simplied Stylized Postal Network (Wein 2009, p. 6 (similar))
The value creation chain of postal services encompasses mainly the four basic
operations collecting, processing, transport, and delivery of postal items. The rst step
in this chain is to collect the mail. Typically, the postman collects the post which has
been dropped into the letterboxes or receives it at the post-oce counter. After the mail
has been collected, it is transported (usually in trucks or vans) to the next processing
centres where it is processed in order to deliver it to the right destination. Subsequently,
the mail can be transported to another mail-processing centre located in the target
region whereas one can distinguish between long-haul and short-range transport using
10air or rail transportation facilities and trucking facilities respectively. When the mail has
been processed, it is transported further to the delivery base where it is sorted according
to delivery routes and then delivered by the postman by foot, car or bicycle. The
delivery function is the most meaningful postal operation because the costs associated
with providing this operation form the biggest portion among the total costs (Kruse et
al. 2005, p. 18). This complex operation is typically divided into three components:
route time, access time, and load time. Route time represents the time which is required
to cross the route. These routes are in rural areas longer than in urban areas. In the next
step the deliverer must departure from these routes to access the destinations, which is
analogically called access time. Finally, load time represents the time required to drop
the mail into the letter-box or to hand it out to the recipient (Rogerson et al. 1993, p.
114).
Mail service providers can operate on all value-added-steps mentioned above or only
on selected ones (Christmann 2004, pp. 31). If a provider oers multiple or all value-
added-steps, it is called vertical integrated. The degree of the vertical integration, hence,
shows on how many steps the provider operates. Vertical integration can range from
two to all value-added-steps (Sch olermann 2005, p. 3). The opposite of the vertical
integration would exist, if the provider operates on merely one step and obtains the rest
of the services on the market. The decision of the vertical integration depends on its
protability. This is particularly the case, when the technological and organizational
economies of scope are highly pronounced. More precisely, it is benecial for a rm to
oer multiple operations of the value added chain, if economies of scope exist between
this operations, that is to say if it is cheaper to provide the specic operations combined
than separated from each other. In very general terms, coordination economies are
present in this case. Coordination economies may lead to the existence of subadditivity
of the network as a whole, although the sole operations of the network do not exhibit
features of natural monopoly (Rogerson et al. 1993, p. 113). The sources of natural
monopoly can primarily be attributed to the sources of scope economies. Examples
for this include the common usage of resources and transaction advantages through the
11combination of two or more operations of the network.
Although an integrated network can be reasonable in an industry in certain circum-
stances, it can bring eciency disadvantages about. It occurs, if one of the value-added-
steps is a natural monopoly whereas the rest of the steps should be organized competi-
tively for eciency reasons. The vertical integration does not allow for the installation of
competition in the other steps, so that eciency potentials cannot be exploited. Applied
to the postal sector, it was found that the delivery-operation exhibits natural monopoly
features. Hence, the delivery operation should for eciency reasons not be organized
competitively whereas the other steps should be organized competitively.2 The delivery-
step is a monopolistic bottleneck.
The theory of natural monopoly discussed above can be applied either to the whole
network or to single steps of it. In this context, it is to determine whether the network as
a whole or some of its operations satisfy the sucient conditions of the natural monopoly.
Statistically this can be tested by estimating the cost-function and analyzing whether
the cost-structure is subadditive as described earlier in this paper. The following chapter
deals with dierent studies, which have been conducted to test for this.
4 Contestability
As has been shown in chapter two of this paper, the natural monopoly concept de-
termines, whether - due to eciency reasons - there should be only one supplier for a
specic good or service in a market. Two major regulation issues emerge in this context.
The rst one refers to the question, whether it is necessary to regulate the market entry
in order to prohibit or to allow entry into the market by potential competitors. The
second one refers to the necessity of a price regulation so that - in case of the existence
of a natural monopoly - the monopolist does not charge excessive prices or exploits con-
sumers in any other way. The sole existence of subadditivity as discussed in chapter two
does not automatically justify market regulation in either way. In fact, the combined
consideration of both subadditivity and contestability sheds light on these regulation
2These ndings result from dierent studies which will be discussed in chapter four of this paper.
12issues (Fritsch et al. 2007, pp. 214). For this reason, the contestability concept will be
examined more closely in this section in order to declare its relationship to subadditivity
and its contribution for solving the regulatory issues.
The notion of contestability was primarily used by the American economist William
Baumol in the eighties. This concept was developed in order to characterize markets by
determining whether market entry is possible or not. Although this theory is applicable
to a broad variety of market forms, it pertains primarily to markets with substantial
attributes of natural monopoly. In short, a contestable market can be dened as one
that can easily be entered by potential competitors and vice versa. Generally, it can be
characterized by two main features: free and easy entry into and costless exit from the
market (Baumol 1982, p. 3). Free entry indicates that potential entrants are not at
a disadvantage compared with the incumbents. This refers to the three aspects: costs,
consumer preferences and access to the required production technology. Furthermore,
this refers to access to resourcing and selling markets. If potential entrants are in terms
of these points at a disadvantage compared with incumbent rms, there would exist
asymmetrical market access barriers. A costless exit, on the other hand, implies
that rms can leave the industry without suering a nancial penalty (Griths et al.
2001, p. 83). In general, an exit from the industry is especially expensive, if the rms
need to invest in so-called "sunk cost facilities". These are facilities which cannot be
resold or rented without loss, if the rms intend to exit the market again. Consequently,
the costs of acquiring such facilities cannot be recouped if the rm exits the industry.
These costs are called sunk costs and the decision is in this case characterized as
being irreversible, because it cannot be revised without a nancial penalty (Bailey
1981, Baumol 1982 or Griths et al. 2001). For this reason, these costs are also called
market access costs. It is important not to equalize sunk costs with xed costs due to
the characteristics of sunk costs mentioned above (Bailey 1981, pp. 178). Irreversible
costs do represent fundamental barriers to entry and can hence be causative for lower
contestability of a market. Indeed, sunk costs are only one example for barriers to entry.3
3Fundamentally, sunk costs do not represent entry barriers but exit barriers.
13Apart form sunk costs, one can distinguish between numerous other barriers to entry.
Due to the fact that sunk costs constitute the most crucial barriers, the analysis in this
paper focuses on them.
A further necessary condition for contestability is that the potential entrants can enter
the market before incumbents can react to this entry by reducing their prices. The entry
lag, which represents the period necessary for entering the market, must be smaller than
the price adjustment lag, which represents the period necessary for incumbents to
lower their prices in response to the market entry and thus the increased competition in
the industry (Shepherd 1984, p. 572).
Beyond that, the contestability concept helps to analyze the eect, which potential
market entrants could have on the strategic behaviour of incumbent rms. It turns
out that even the threat of new entry into the market by potential competitors could
aect incumbents' behaviour in terms of price and output decisions, disciplining them
to behave as would exist competition within the market. Consequently, contestable non-
competitive markets behave in a competitive fashion forcing the incumbents to charge
prices which equal their long-run average costs. Although market structure calls for a
single seller, the threat of potential entrants asserts that they are without monopoly
power. This eect is the higher, the easier it is to access and to leave the market. If
the incumbent, notwithstanding, charges excessive prices, the potential entrants would
enter the market and undercut the incumbent, being attracted by the possibility to earn
prots in the industry. This behaviour is in literature known as "hit-and-run entry".
Hit-and-run entry is likely, if sunk costs were not present, because the costs of leaving
the industry become lower (Griths et al. 2001, p. 83). However, this implies that
there is sucient pricing exibility in the industry, which is generally not a realistic
assumption. Oftentimes, prices cannot be changed by implication. Strategically, market
entries can be prevented by incumbents, if they do not exploit their monopolistic power
in terms of pricing and thus the monopoly rents. Hence, the need for public intervention
is in a contestable market dispensable. If on the contrary the market is characterized by
irreversibilities, entry is not possible by implication, because rms outside the market are
14at disadvantage compared with incumbent rms. Unlike the incumbents, the rms need
to account for the sunk costs in their calculations. The threat of potential entrants could,
moreover, force incumbents to be ecient in production. Ineciency in production of
incumbents could attract potential entrants who can produce a specic service or good
to lower costs. The possibility to produce at lower costs allows them to charge lower
prices.
In terms of regulation, it can be concluded that if there is a natural monopoly and the
market is contestable at the same time, regulation becomes unnecessary. This refers to
the former of the two regulation questions at the beginning of this section. Regarding
the second question, it is to say that if the natural monopoly is not contestable, there
is the risk that the monopolist charges excessive prices which makes a governmental
price regulation indispensable. In addition, there is the possibility that the government
needs to stimulate market entry, if a natural monopoly does not exist but there is no
competition on the market, which becomes manifest in a small number of suppliers in
the industry. This could arise from the absence of contestability and the fact that it is
not possible without further ado. A contestable market without a natural monopoly,
however, describes an accustomed competitive environment within the market. The
following table sums the four possible combinations (Fritsch et al. 2007, pp. 214).
Figure 4: Subadditivity and Contestability (Fritsch et al 2007, p. 215 (similar))
15In summary, it can be said that the sole existence of a natural monopoly does not
justify regulation. There is only necessity for regulation, if the natural monopoly is not
contestable. The three conditions for contestability identied in this section are the
following:
• Sunk costs must not be existent
• The entry lag must be smaller than the price adjustment lag
• There must not exist asymmetrical market access barriers, e.g. access to technology
Indeed, contestability can replace governmental regulation to a certain degree. Al-
though the practical relevance of the contestability concept has been mistrusted in several
studies, it appears that it is appropriate to describe the market structure and processes
for many reasons. Figure 4 clearly demonstrates the dimensions, which must be consid-
ered in order to decide on regulation issues in postal markets. Both subadditivity and
contestability must be included in the analysis.
The next section reviews the empirical studies which have been conducted to analyze
whether the postal sector exhibits features of natural monopoly. In addition, it shall be
analyzed, whether these studies accounted for the contestability concept.
5 Empirical Studies
In practice, the conditions of natural monopoly are dicult to prove. However, numerous
empirical investigations shed light on the presence of these conditions in the mail delivery
sector. This section reports the empirical investigations which have been conducted
to determine whether there are scale and/or scope economies in postal services. The
authors of the reviewed studies estimate for this purpose cost functions in order to
analyze the existence of these economies or subadditivity respectively.
The theme of scale and scope economies is not only analyzed for the whole network
but for single postal operations as well. The most econometric studies rely on an analysis
of the postal delivery function, which results from the fact that the delivery function
16makes the greatest portion of the costs within the postal operations. The amount of the
studies which deal with the collection, transport, and processing of mail is signicantly
smaller. Most authors assume in their studies an operational structure resembling the
one discussed in chapter 2 of this paper. For their analysis the authors proceed in their
econometric studies as follows. First, the cost function of the postal delivery sector is
being estimated. This estimated cost function is then taken to measure economies of
scale and scope or to analyze the existence of subadditivity. In connection with their
estimation the authors discuss the public policy implications of their theoretical and
empirical results. Despite the importance of this topic for public policy, there is little
evidence for it. The table at the end of this chapter lists the most important research
eorts.
One of the rst studies was undertaken by Gupta and Gupta. In their empirical
investigations they analyze the existence of scale and scope economies in the operations of
the United States Postal Service (USPS) using published postal data from 1961 to 1980.
For this purpose they estimate the postal cost function on the basis of a translog cost
function and account for labour, capital, transportation and space as factor inputs. The
outputs were aggregated to two products due to limitations of the data. Based on this,
they computed the scale economies estimates from the translog cost function and draw
inferences regarding existence and intensity of scale and scope economies. The authors
demonstrate in their study the existence of diseconomies of scale and economies of scope.
The value for scale economies vary between 0.196 and 0.448. The striking variation in
the estimates results from the sensitivity of the estimates of scale elasticities to capital
cost changes, which are included in the dataset and in the estimation. This, however
does not aect their main result that there are diseconomies of scale (Gupta et al. 1985).
One study in which the postal network has been examined as a whole (i.e. all opera-
tions in common) has been made by Norsworthy et al.. This results from the fact that
the authors estimate the costs of Management Sectional Centers (MSCs) in their study.
MSCs operate in the US on the whole postal network and are therefore responsible for col-
lecting, processing, and delivering the postal items. The estimation has being processed
17using data from 200 MSCs in 1984. As a functional form they employed a translog-
function variable cost function. The authors could detect economies of scale to the
amount of 10% in their estimations (Scale coecient: 1.099) (Norsworthy et al. 1991).
Rogerson and Takis also analyzed whether the USPS postal operations exhibit scale
or scope economies concentrating on the cost structure. They use for their analysis a
simple model of the postal network of the USPS in which the postal services are divided
into the components delivery, transportation and mail processing, which resembles the
model discussed in section 3. To analyze whether there exist economies of scale, the
authors choose the cost-elasticity of the output as a measure and derivate the measures
from marginal cost-based rates. Moreover, in their study they used information from
PRC data and several recent empirical studies of economies of scale and scope in the
USPS. They calculated a value amounting to 35% for the delivery function.4 They
found out that there are scale economies in the delivery function but not in the pro-
cessing and long-haul transportation which supports the hypothesis of Panzar (1991)
(Rogerson et al. 1993).
In their analysis, Bradley and Colvin analyzed whether the postal delivery function
is a natural monopoly testing it for subadditivity and estimating the degree of scope
economies among individual products in this operational function. In their approach,
they modelled costs as number of stops whereas they focused only on the access portion
of delivery and ignored the loading time.5 Furthermore, they implied in their model a
direct and positive relationship between the volume of delivered items and the delivery
costs. The authors used a non-linear least squares estimation in which the explanatory
variables are the volume, the possible number of stops and the likelihood that an increase
in the volume will generate additional actual stops which equal accesses to the delivery
points. The data used in this study consists of mail volumes and delivery stops from
a cross section of the USPS city carrier routes and encompasses a sample of routes
from roughly 150,000 city delivery routes maintained by the USPS. The authors found
4This measure is discussed in section 2.
5The single components of the delivery operation are discussed in chapter 3.
18both subadditivity of the delivery cost function and economies of scope. Moreover, they
found in this study that there are scale economies in the transportation function. In their
examination they detected only small eects for the long-haul transport with railroad
or airplane estimating scale economies on average amounting to 1.03. They estimated
larger eects for the road haulage which vary between 1.11 for long and 1.52 for short
ranges (Bradley et al. 1994).
Cohen and Chu examined the impact of economies of scale using the example of
the delivery function of the USPS. In their approach they rst calculate the costs of the
delivery function assuming that there is only one single rm, which oers this operation.
In the next step they deviate from the assumption of the existence of a monopoly and
calculate again the costs assuming that there are two identical rms, which are oering
the delivery function (duopoly). Moreover, they assume that these two rms share the
market equally and that each of them serves the entire country each delivery day. For
their analysis, they disaggregate street delivery time in three subcomponents: a xed
route time, a partly variable access time depending on volume and a completely variable
load time also depending on the volume.6 The data used in this study encompasses a
representative sample including data of street delivery costs, volumes and delivery point
characteristics collected by the postal service. This data is observed every two weeks
over a one year period for about 300 routes. As a result, the authors calculated higher
costs in the duopoly case as in the single-rm case. This is deeply rooted in the fact that
the x costs accrue two times in the duopoly case, because each rm has to establish its
own delivery network. From this, the authors inferred subadditivity in the cost structure
of the US delivery function (Cohen et al. 1997).
The study of Wada et al. diers from the above-mentioned studies predominantly
in two points. First, this study does not deal with the US postal market, but with the
Japanese one. And second, the authors do not only concentrate on the delivery function,
but also measure overall economies of scale, economies of scope and cost subadditivity.
Therefore, the objective of investigation in this study is the postal network as a whole
6These components of the delivery function are discussed in section 3.
19as it was proceeded in the study of Norsworthy et al. mentioned earlier in this section.
They use two dierent multiproduct cost functions of the Japanese mail service whereas
one is based on a usual translog cost function and the other on a generalized translog
cost function and conduct the estimation using cross-sectional data from 1980 to 1994
encompassing 180 observation points. The total costs are estimated using the number
of mail items, labour price input and goods price input. It results from this study that
there are signicant scope economies and overall scale economies lying between 1.03 and
1.06 in the Japanese postal market (Wada et al. 1997).
Cazals et al. undertook three major studies two of them dealing with the postal
delivery function and one with the activities of post oce counters. The study con-
ducted in 1997 attempts to provide empirical evidence for subadditivity of the delivery
process in the French postal services. For this purpose, the authors estimate both a
parametric and a non-parametric model whereas they concentrate on the specications
and results of the parametric model. They use this parametric model to obtain a mea-
sure for returns to scale and to run simulation scenarios to test for subadditivity. For
their estimation, they use data about mail volumes, labour quantities and environmen-
tal characteristics for a cross-section of 400 post oces in France in 1992. Moreover,
information about types of delivery and on the working hours in the dierent activities
is considered (Cazals et al. 1997).
In their study from 2001a the authors also deal with the delivery activity. Their
objective in this study is to analyze possible cost drivers for outdoor postal delivery
activities and to explore size eects of the delivered items on the cost of outdoor delivery
using French data. The authors dene the characteristics of postal items (e.g. weight of
the postal item) or environmental features as for example density of the delivery area
as the appropriate cost drivers. This study uses index models to analyze these cost
drivers. After estimating cost functions, measures of size eects are derived from the
estimations. For their estimation in this study the authors use a xed eects approach
with a parametric specication of the cost functions and apply a within estimation
procedure. The main variables in the equation are the outdoor delivery costs (measured
20by the number of hours of labour worked in a week), the vector of output quantities and
the density of the delivery area of each post oce measured by the number of delivery
points divided by the length of the route. The data used comes from a database of La
Poste with data from 1994 to 1998 concerning around 9000 French delivery post oces.
The ve periods are considered for estimating the panel data model using a translog
cost function. The cross-sectional analysis is processed using the data for the year 1998
because of the high quality. In both estimations the authors could nd increasing returns
to scale whereas the value for returns to scale in the xed eects approach is higher than
in the cross-sectional analysis. In short, the estimation with cross-sectional data yielded
a scale economies measure amounting to 1.13 whereas the panel data estimation result
amounted to 1.68 (Cazals et al. 2001a).
The third study of these authors is from 2001b and deals unlike the other two men-
tioned with the front-oce activities in the postal counters network of La Poste in
France. The aim of the authors in this study is to obtain estimators of cost elasticity for
all activities performed at counters in post oces by analyzing their cost function. For
this aim, they decompose the production process of counters into front- and back oce
activities to obtain an estimate of the cost elasticity for the counters activities. The out-
put of postal counters is measured by all operations and services oered to the customers
at these counters. To derive the estimates, the authors choose an OLS regression and
run dierent scenarios with the available data. In the rst scenario the authors assume
that two rms share the existing volume of mail whereas in the second scenario they
assume that one rm takes all oces whose volume of mail is above the average and two
rms share the remaining oces. In the third scenario one rm takes all oces where
volume of mail is lower than the average and two rms share the rest of the post oces.
This proceeding is redolent of the approach chosen by the authors Cohen and Chu in
their study from 1997. The established models are used to compute an average amount
of labour per post oce. The obtained values are used by the authors to compare them
with the values obtained by La Poste as a whole. The variables considered in these es-
timations are the cost of counter activity for a post oce, sales and after-sales services,
21nancial services and the back-oce activities for each post oce. The data used to
estimate the models comes from 9,168 post oces of the French public postal network
observed in 1999. The authors found that on average counter activities are characterized
by scale economies (80%). Furthermore they concluded that scope economies may also
be present for the various front-oce activities (Cazals et al. 2001b).
Bernard et al. published a study in which they explore reasons in order to explain
the dierences in delivery costs among dierent geographic areas. For this purpose they
compare the delivery costs between two dierent countries: France and US. After pre-
senting the demographic and postal delivery characteristics they develop the concept of
postal density to account for these characteristics in the estimation. The authors choose
two dierent approaches to derive the average costs. For the US they econometrically
estimate a translog equation of street time while for France they estimate this variable
using an engineering cost model. The dependent variable in the estimation is - as al-
ready mentioned - street time and the independent variables are the volume (pieces per
address), the postal density and the number of addresses. The French data represent
delivery data for La Poste which is available for each delivery area whereas each delivery
area represents a postcode. The US data is from the City Carrier Cost System and
the Rural National Count System and encompasses data from 39,737 rural routes and a
stratied sample of 8,300 city routes for the year 1999. The authors found that volume
is a more important cost driver at low postal density than at high postal density. The
French postal density is higher at every quantile. At high postal densities the xed costs
are lower and thus the potential for scale economies is lower (Bernard et al. 2002).
A further study was published by Gazzei et al. dealing with the output elasticity
of post oce activities in Italy. The authors estimated several production functions
in order to evaluate the role of universal service obligations (USOs).7 To resolve the
problem of the relation between unsaturation and scale economies the authors estimate
7Traditionally, the USO assures the provision of standard postal services at uniform and aordable
quality and rates. This task was usually imposed on the monopolist (Crew et al. 1998).
22production frontiers and choose the translog functional form because of its exibility.8
The overall scale economies are then derived through the proportionate change of all
input factors and the corresponding change of the output. The authors choose four
dierent models in order to estimate the scale economies and used data from 11,415
counters in Italy for the year 2000. They detected returns to scale in all oces regardless
of their size. Furthermore, they found that the bigger the post oce, the smaller the
resulting unsaturation and therefore the smaller the potential scale economies. These
results have been found in all estimations made by these authors (Gazzei et al. 2002).
Bradley et al. applied themselves to measuring scale and scope economies for the
postal delivery function. Their aim was to obtain reliable measures of their magnitudes
through modelling the USPS's method for optimizing its delivery network. For this
purpose they specify a two-equation recursive model in order to reproduce the two-step
delivery process of the USPS. First, the number of routes per zip code is determined
and after that the time per route within the zip code. For their estimation they choose
a quadratic functional form because of its ability to allow for increasing, constant or de-
creasing returns to scale and, besides, because of its ability to accommodate zero volumes
in the dataset. The variables incorporated are prepared mail, cased mail and delivered
mail. The dataset consists of daily observations on the total street time and volumes
delivered. These observations are taken over a two week period equalling 11 delivery
days in spring 2002. Moreover, the density variable has been added to the estimation
to control for the geographic density of a zip code. The authors found that increases in
delivered volume within a zip code lead to an increase in the number of routes required
to provide the delivery service. An increase of the routes causes an increase in delivery
time. In sum, the nding in this study is that the postal service exhibits characteristics
of a natural monopoly. Not only scale and scope economies could be detected but also
8The translog function - a generalization of the Cobb-Douglas and CES functional forms - does not
imply constant substitution-elasticities in all factor-combinations. Thus, this functional form allows
for an approximation of the real cost structure by the development of a second-order Taylor series
approximation. An application of this functional form is especially appropriate, if the real functional
form is unknown (Schierjott et al. 1985, pp. 190).
23coordination economies between the postal operations (Bradley et al. 2006).9
The last study to be mentioned is one made for the Swiss postal market undertaken
by the authors Farsi et al. In this study they analyze the existence of scale, scope
and density economies on the basis of a quadratic cost function using a cross-section
dataset from the Swiss Post from 2004. The cost function for the delivery units of
Swiss Post considers the two outputs mail and parcel and the two input factors labour
and capital. Furthermore, the labour price (measured as the average annual salary of a
full-time-equivalent delivery employee) and the capital price (measured as the ratio of
the non-labour expenses to a measure of physical capital) are used for the estimation.
Moreover, a variable representing the number of delivery points in the service area and
a further one representing the number of aliated local delivery units are included in
the model. Additionally, dummy variables representing northern, eastern, western an
southern regions are included in the model. The model is estimated using four dierent
econometric specications: ordinary least squares model, two dierent weighted least
squares models and a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression model. The data used
in this study consists of a cross-section of 328 mail delivery units operated by Swiss
Post's letter section which are organized as 241 local delivery units and 87 regional
centres. In this study, the authors could nd empirical evidence for economies of scale,
scope and density in all models whereas the last mentioned model yields the best results
(Farsi et al. 2006).10
In summary, the authors have found in their empirical studies results indicating the
existence of signicant scale and scope economies in delivery. The results of the dierent
investigations are uniform, but they dier from each other mainly in degree of scale and
scope economies detected. The table set out in the annex summarizes the results of
these studies. All studies have in common that they only consider the incumbent in
their analysis but neither the actual nor the potential competitors on the market. This
becomes manifest on the one hand in the models built for the analysis and on the other
9The notion of coordination economies has been claried in chapter 3.
10There are some more studies which are not mentioned in this paper but they are indeed similar to
those discussed here.
24hand in the underlying dataset used to estimate the measures. Regarding the approaches
there are dierences in methodology chosen and in the underlying data. Consequently,
a comparison between the dierent studies is due to these dierences only possible to a
limited extent. Most authors concentrate on analyzing whether scale or scope economies
exist in individual postal operations ignoring the existence of coordination economies
between the dierent operations. Furthermore, the widely spread use of the Translog-
Specication is not without controversy.11 To analyze whether the postal sector should
be for eciency reasons regulated as a monopoly, the authors test only for the existence
of the conditions of natural monopoly. In their approaches the authors do not consider
the contestability aspect.12 Indeed, it has been shown in this paper that if a natural
monopoly exists and the market is at the same time contestable, the market tends to
result in an ecient outcome meaning that prices are not as high as in a monopoly
which is not contestable. The same argument applies to the quality of the services.
This results from the fact, that the incumbent in a contestable monopoly encounters a
durable threat of potential competitors which forces him to set prices and quality level
akin to the competition case. As a result, the market faces an ecient outcome and a
legal regulation is dispensable. Thus, the existence of a natural monopoly is necessary
but not sucient to decide for legal regulatory measures. The dierent facets of the
contestability aspect should rather be included in the analysis, which is certainly what
Demsetz 1968 had in mind when he remarked that it is sunk costs and not economies of
scale which constitute the barrier to entry that confers monopoly power (Demsetz 1968,
pp. 55).
11That is why some authors choose the quadratic functional form, because - unlike the translog form
- it can accommodate zero volumes in the dataset. Logarithmic forms like the Cobb-Douglas or
translog would require additional adjustments.
12See section 4 of this paper.
256 Conclusions
The analysis in this paper focused on the exploration of the theoretical foundations of
natural monopoly theory and reviewed the major empirical studies, which have been
conducted to analyze this theme for the postal sector. The primary implications of
the theoretical analysis refer to the question whether competition should be introduced
in the postal market and in which concrete area of the postal network this should be
done. Competition should be encouraged where the sucient conditions of natural
monopoly are not satised. In general, the authors have found that this holds for all
postal operations except for the postal delivery function. However, it has been shown
that it is indispensable to account for the contestability of a market in order to decide on
regulatory issues. This aspect has not been considered adequately in previous studies.
Moreover, empirical estimations only take data into consideration from the incumbent.
In fact, information from actual and potential competitors of the incumbent must be
increasingly included in the analysis. Another question to consider is how competition
can be introduced in the specic operations if this is necessary. A separation of the
postal delivery function could be for example a solution. However, this could lead to a
disrupt of scope and coordination economies. Referring to these aspects, a great deal of
research is still required.
7 Future Perspectives
One of the latest developments in the letter market is the initiation of the legally binding
electronic letter. The electronic letter has already been successfully adopted in two
European countries (Finland and Switzerland) and Germany is just about to adopt the
German equivalent of this electronic letter called De-Mail.13 This electronic letter diers
from the accustomed e-mail in the sense that it requires a registration with identication
card. Whether this innovation will be successful must be awaited. The fact is that a
13The Finnish version is called NetPosti and the Swiss one is called Inca-Mail both provided by the
respective incumbent of the market.
26success of this concept would have a huge impact for mail service providers. One of
these impacts applies to the cost structure of the mail service provider since - as it was
described in chapter three and four of this paper - the delivery costs represent currently
the highest cost pool. The delivery operation disappears in case of the sending of an
electronic letter.14 A further impact is that the letter market is opened for competitors
from the information and communications technology market.
14This does not apply to a hybrid form where the sent electronic letter is being printed, enveloped and
hereupon delivered.
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328 Appendix - Summary of Major Research Eorts
Authors Date Title Data Region Approach Results
Gupta et
al.
1985 Economies of Scale and
Economies of Scope in the
U.S. Postal Service
published postal data for
1961-1980
U.S. estimation of postal
translog cost function and
inferences regarding scale
and scope economies
economies of scale esti-
















1993 Economies of Scale and
Scope and Competition in
Postal Service
PRC data / several re-
cent empirical studies of
economies of scale and
scope in the USPS
U.S., EU derivation of measures of
economies of scale and
scope from marginal cost
based rates
scale economies in delivery
but no scope economies;
returns to scale in some




1994 An Econometric Model of
Postal Delivery
a sample of routes from
roughly 150,000 city deliv-
ery routes maintained by
the USPS




1997 Empirical Analysis of
Economies of Scale,















1997 A Measure of Scale
Economies for Postal
Systems
CCS data for 1993 (8,000
route-level observations)
and data from an unpub-
lished paper (1988) based
on UPU statistics which
are based on communica-
tions with ocials
U.S., UK delivery function; compar-
ison of the cost of pro-
viding delivery by a sin-
gle rm with the cost of
providing delivery by two
identical rms
existence of economies of
density; delivery costs are
in the case of two rms are
around 50% higher; value
of scale USA 1988 (1993):
12% (13%) of the total
cost; UK 1988: 17%; ef-
fects of economies of scale
in delivery present signi-
cant barriers to entry
Cazals et
al.
1997 Scale Economies and





cross section of 400 post
oces in 1992
France parametric and non-
parametric




2001a An Analysis of some Spe-
cic Cost Drivers in the
Delivery Activity
data from 1997 cross sec-
tional data from 1998 (i),




translog cost function scale economies: 1.13-1.68
for France and 1.17 for EU-
Countries; a 10% increase
of postal density leads to
a 2.7% decline of costs in
France and 2.9% decline





2001b An Econometric Study
of Cots Elasticity in the
Activities of Post Oce
Counters





2002 Delivery Cost Heterogene-
ity and Vulnerability to
Entry
data from 39,737 rural
routes and a stratied
sample of 8,300 city routes
France,
U.S.




postal density is low:
France 23% and US 42%;
postal density is high:
France 13% and US 36%
Gazzei et
al.
2002 On the Output Elasticity
of the Activities of Post
Oce Counters in Italy
database of 11,415 coun-
ters in Italy
Italy estimation of production
functions: OLS over the
whole sample (Model I);
OLS over a subset of ob-
servations ltered by a
stochastic frontier (Model
II); like Model II but in-
cluding quadratic terms in
x (Model IIa); OLS over
a subset of observations
ltered with DEA model
(Model III)
Model I: 1.2063; Model II:
1.2034; Model IIa: 1.2225;
Model III: 1.1060; returns
of scale in all oces be-
tween 10 and 25%
Bradley
et al.
2006 Measuring Scale and Scope
Economies with a Struc-
tural Model of Postal De-
livery
data from 145 zip codes
daily observations over a
2 week period (11 delivery
days in the spring of 2002)






2006 Economies of Scale, Den-
sity and Scope in Swiss
Post's Mail Delivery
cross-section data from
2004 (information on 327
postal units)
Switzerland quadratic specication
to estimate measures of
economies of scale, density
and scope (between mail
and parcels)(4 dierent
models)
scale economies as well as
scope economies
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